We examine the impact of influenza on the U.S. stock market. A higher incidence of flu is associated with decreased trading, decreased volatility, and higher bid-ask spreads. We also find some evidence that more flu implies lower stock returns. Consistent with the flu affecting institutional investors and marketmakers, the decrease in trading activity and volatility is primarily driven by the incidence of influenza in the greater New York City area. However, the effect of the flu on bid-ask spreads and returns is driven by the incidence of flu nationally. We provide estimates of the potential impacts of a pandemic on equity returns.
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I. Introduction
We hypothesize that a higher influenza rate can disrupt equity markets as some key individuals would be either ill or absent from work helping tend for sick family members. These key individuals could include market-makers, institutional investors, or other participants in the financial markets. An existing literature documents how the flu causes individuals to miss work regardless of job characteristics such as job intricacy, authority, or stressfulness (see Mohren et al., 2005) . A separate literature also discusses the general economic impacts of influenza (see, for instance, McKibbon and Sidorenko, 2006) . The goal of this paper is to examine the implications of the flu on U.S. equity markets over a number of years where detailed flu incidence data is available.
We hypothesize that a higher rate of influenza would decrease volume and turnover.
Similarly, a higher incidence of flu would coincide with decreases in trading volatility as the absence of key market participants reduces information flows and the production of information. 1 A greater incidence of flu could also be associated with a higher bid-ask spread as a decline in market participants would decrease liquidity and necessitate greater spreads.
Alternatively, the decline in information production and volatility may partially offset this decline in liquidity. Moreover, the flu could also influence stock returns, either through the change in liquidity risk (see, for instance, Amihud and Mendelson, 1986) or because of a direct effect of flu on expected economic activity and expected returns.
Using data on NYSE traded stocks and weekly observations of flu samples from the CDC, we show that seasonal variation in the flu has an observable impact on U.S. equity 1 A number of studies find that volatility is contemporaneously correlated with volume; see, for instance, Karpoff (1987) , Bessimbinder and Seguin (1993), and Chordia, Roll, and Subramanyam (2002) . See French and Roll (1986) and Fleming, Kirby, and Ostdiek (2006) on information production during the trading day.
3 markets. Specifically, greater flu incidence is associated with decreased trading, lower realized volatility, increased bid-ask spreads, and lower returns. We test whether these impacts on the market are due to the incidence of flu in the New York area, to the incidence of flu in the region close to the company's headquarters, or the overall incidence of the flu nationally. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) show that ownership is higher close to the company's headquarters, while institutional investors and traders are often located in or close to New York City. Consistent with a larger impact from market-makers and institutional investors, the effects on trading activity and volatility are largest when using flu incidence from the mid-Atlantic region which includes the New York area. We find that the headquarters location flu effect is smaller than the national effect, and this national effect dominates when examining the impacts on bid-ask spreads and returns. We also provide evidence that the impact of flu on trading activity and volatility drives the relation between flu and bid-ask spreads.
An existing literature documents the impact of seasonal affective disorder (SAD) on equity markets (see Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi, 2003) . We therefore include the SAD onset variable introduced by Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi, (2007) . In doing so, we obtain results consistent with both the SAD literature and our other findings. A separate literature identifies the effect of weather on stock returns (see Saunders, 1993; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; and Goetzmann and Zhu, 2005) . We therefore show that our analysis is robust to controlling for weather effects, specifically New York cloud-cover.
Lastly, we produce some rough estimates of how much a pandemic, like either the 1918-1920 or the 1957-58 outbreak, would impact equity returns. With the appearance of the H1N1 virus in 2009, growing concerns about the possibility of a disastrous pandemic have reappeared.
As Potter (2001) describes, pandemics recur at 10 to 50 year intervals. The 20 th century saw two 4 well documented pandemics, in 1918-1920 and in 1957-1958 . The 2009 H1N1 pandemic did not produce the number of fatalities associated with these prior pandemics.
Section II describes the data and method used in the analysis. Section III reviews our empirical analysis. Section IV relates our results to historical and predicted influenza outbreaks, and section V concludes.
II. Data and Method
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) collects data from laboratories on the number and percentage of positive flu samples tested by week and region of the country. We use a sample of this data from Fall 1997 through 2006. 2,3 As the incidence of flu is seasonal and as we expect some lag between when an individual becomes ill and when the lab test is performed, our primary measure is the percentage change in the number of flu samples testing positive in the subsequent week. This is computed as the change in the log of the number of flu cases plus one, and our results are largely robust to alternative measures. We use three measures of flu severity. , where Vol refers to the number of shares traded in the given week and
Shares equals the number of shares outstanding during the week. This measure corrects for the skewness typically observed in the distribution of volume.
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We measure the bid-ask spread using the logarithm of the average weekly time-weighted effective percentage spread, PSpread. 4 Specifically, PSpread equals the difference between the trade price and the midpoint of the active quote divided by the midpoint of the active quote weighted by the time between trades. We use the level of the bid-ask spread in our analysis as past research indicates this measure is stationary (see for example, Engle and Patton, 2004) . We also examine average weekly returns and weekly realized volatility. Realized volatility is calculated as the average unsigned 10 minute return over the week similar to the measure used in Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) . As in Andersen, et. al. 2001 , we use the logarithm of realized volatility to correct for skewness. We further consider the order imbalance (OIB), equal to the number of buy orders minus the number of sell orders divided by the total number of buy and sell orders (see for example, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2004) . We identify buy and sell orders as in Lee and Ready (1996) ; as in Bessembinder (2003), for recent TAQ data, we make no allowance for reporting lags when matching quotes to trades.
Our primary regressions include dummy variables for the week of the year and the calendar year. We also include a dummy variable for the period after the NYSE introduced decimalization: In order to adjust for heteroskedasticity, we use robust standard errors in our aggregated data, and robust standard errors with firm-level clustering in the firm-level analysis. Thus these errors are robust both along the firm-dimension and, as we include week and year dummies, to clustering by week and year.
We fit additional regressions to measure the direct versus indirect impacts of flu on our variables of interest. For instance, we add turnover as an additional control to the volatility regressions; we add volume, volatility, the inverse of price, and the market-value of equity to the bid-ask spread regressions, and so on. We also control for weather effects and for Seasonal
Affective Disorder (SAD) in some of our regressions. In order to correct for possible SAD effects, we drop our weekly dummies and follow Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi (2007) average weekly cloud cover, and another for whether there are few clouds, less than 40% average weekly cloud cover, during the hours of 6:00 AM to 6:00 PM EST. 
III. Empirical Results
III.A. Index Portfolio Regression
To begin our analysis, we fit our primary regression specification using the aggregated sample which includes the weekly index portfolio of all NYSE stocks. Trading volume, number of shares outstanding, return, volatility, and percentage spread are averaged across all firms by week. Additionally, value-weighted averages are calculated for volatility, percentage spreads, and returns using each firm's market value of equity as weights. Using weekly observations from this aggregated portfolio, we regress each of the dependent variables on the U.S. and NY flu variables. We control for calendar and time effects with weekly and yearly dummy variables and we include a dummy for the period after the change to NYSE decimalization. 6 Table II reports the coefficients for the national and New York flu variables for each dependent variable.
6 Including the weather variables or excluding the decimalization dummy from these regressions does not affect our results.
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Panel A of The effect of flu in New York on dollar volume is larger than the overall national effect; a one standard deviation increase in NY flu implies a 3.0% decline in dollar trading volume, and this effect is significant at the 1% level. The impact of flu outside of the New York area is statistically insignificant. These results suggest that the largest impact on dollar trading volume is due to the effect of flu on New York area traders.
Panel B of Table II considers the impact of flu on turnover. The impact of overall U.S.
flu is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, whereas the effect of NY flu on turnover is negative and significant at the 1% level. Again, the impact of flu outside of the New York area is statistically insignificant. Panel C provides similar results with the number of trades as the dependent variable. Again, the incidence of flu in the NY area is of primary importance, and similarly, the impact of overall U.S. flu and non-NY Flu is statistically insignificant. A one standard deviation increase in NY flu implies a 2.1% decline in the number of trades. These results again suggest that the effect of flu on trading activity is largely due to its impact on New
York area traders. Table II provide regressions with equal-weighted and value-weighted volatility as the dependent variables. 7 Similar to the results for trading activity, the largest impact of flu is from the New York area. The impact of the incidence of flu in the NY area on volatility is negative and significant at the 10% level for equal-weighted volatility and at the 5% level for value-weighted volatility. To the extent that volatility reflects the incorporation of information production into prices, this result implies that greater absenteeism in the NY area implies lower information production as in French and Roll (1986) .
Panels D and E of
Panels F and G of Table II Panels H through I of Table II provide regressions with equal-weighted and valueweighted returns as the dependent variables. The coefficients on the flu are not significant in any of these regressions, and we refine this analysis in our disaggregated sample below.
III.B Pooled Regressions
To continue are analysis, we test the impact of national, New York, and headquarters flu on our dependent variables of interest using our disaggregated sample, a weekly unbalanced panel containing firm-by-firm observations. Using each firm's observations and controlling for heteroskedasticity allows for greater precision than with aggregated data, and the results are largely consistent with those presented in aggregated data. For each dependent variable, we run three regressions, each including one of our flu variables: 1) national, 2) NY, and 3)
headquarters' state flu. For volatility, percentage spread, and returns, we consider a fourth regression that includes controls commonly encountered in the literature. As in our primary specification, we include weekly dummies, yearly dummies, and a dummy for the NYSE change to decimalization. We also control for New York cloud cover. Table III reports the coefficients for the regressions using our trading activity measures. Tables IV, V, and VI report the coefficients on the volatility, percentage spread, and return regressions.
The first three columns of Table III The second column of Table III considers the flu in the New York and non-NY regions, and the third column includes the flu in the regions where the firm is headquartered and the 12 remainder of the U.S. outside of the headquarters state. As for the results using the index portfolio, the effect of the flu in New York is larger than the overall national and non-NY effect.
A one standard deviation increase in NY flu implies a 2.6% decline in dollar trading volume. The impact of flu incidence in all regions outside New York is that one standard deviation increase in flu incidence implies a 1% decline in volume. The impact of headquarters' state flu is small compared to the New York effect. These results confirm the index portfolio results, and they are consistent with the notion that the largest impact of the flu on dollar trading volume is due to the effect of flu on New York area traders.
The second three columns of Table III provide similar results with turnover as the dependent variable. Again, the incidence of flu in the New York area is of primary importance.
A one standard deviation increase in NY flu implies a 4.6% decline in turnover. The last three columns consider the impact of flu on the number of trades. Similar to the results for volume and turnover, the effect of NY flu is predominant. A one standard deviation increase in NY flu implies a 2% decrease in the number of trades. As with dollar volume and turnover, the impact of home state flu on trades is nearly an order of magnitude lower. These results again suggest that the flu effect is largely due to its impact on New York area traders. Table IV considers the impact of flu on stock volatility. The first three columns of Table   IV provide regressions with volatility as the dependent variable and the incidence of flu, cloudcover, the calendar and decimalization dummies, and weekly and yearly dummies as independent variables. Volatility lagged one-week is also included to control for autocorrelation. Consistent with the aggregated sample results and with a reduction in information flow, the impact of flu on volatility is negative and the impact is strongest for flu in the New York region. A one standard deviation increase in NY flu implies an approximate 0.7% decrease in realized volatility.
13
To sort out the direct impact of flu on volatility and the indirect impact of flu through its impact on trading activity, we add turnover as a control in the last three columns of Table IV. The existing research finds a positive relationship between volume and volatility. 8 As expected, the coefficient on turnover is positive and significant. The effect of NY flu on volatility is diminished but remains negative and significant at the 0.1% level. After controlling for turnover, a one standard deviation increase in U.S. flu implies a decrease in volatility of approximately 0.5%. Table V shows how the flu is related to the effective percentage spread. In contrast to the results for trading activity and volatility, the predominant impact on spreads is from the national flu variable. A one standard deviation increase in U.S. flu corresponds to a 1% increase in percentage spread. Regressions with NY area and non-NY area flu incidence or headquarters' area and non-headquarters area also suggest that the impact of bid-ask spreads is not localized to one portion of the country. Overall, the bid-ask spread regressions suggest that a greater incidence of leads to a less liquid market in which overall and informed trade is diminished and, in the net, market makers increase spreads.
Typical cross-sectional regression equations that model percentage spreads include contemporaneous volume, lagged volatility, inverse price, and market value as explanatory variables (see, for instance, Madhavan, 2000) . We add these additional variables as controls in the last three columns of Table V . As expected, the coefficients on volume and market value are negative and significant, and the coefficients on lagged volatility and the inverse of price are positive and significant. The coefficient on the U.S. flu and NY flu variables remain significant at the 0.1% level; however, the magnitude of the coefficients on U.S. flu and non-H.S. flu are reduced by approximately 80% and the coefficient on non-NY flu is reduced by approximately 66%. Overall, the flu appears to impact percentage spreads primarily through its effects on volume and volatility.
Table VI considers the impact of flu incidence on returns. Returns may be affected both because greater flu incidence lowers real economic activity and also because of the impact of liquidity on returns. 9 That is, a large literature (see, for instance, Amihud and Mendelson, 1986) addresses the pricing of illiquidity. Given our results on volume and percentage spread, we expect a decrease in returns as liquidity decreases with greater flu incidence. Consistent with these hypotheses, we find that U.S., NY, and headquarters flu incidence is significantly York cloud-cover days are related to higher returns.
We consider regressions including contemporaneous and lagged order imbalance and lagged bid-ask spread in the last three columns of Table VI . Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2004) find that daily NYSE individual stock returns are positively related to contemporaneous order imbalance and negatively related to one-day lagged order imbalances. Chan and Fong (2000) find this relationship is strongest in large NYSE trades. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) find that returns are a concave function of bid-ask spreads. As markets adjust to reductions in 9 Note that all these regressions include weekly dummies. Thus, while we expect some portion of flu to be predictable, the flu incidence after controlling for weekly effects can be interpreted as the unexpected flu activity.
15 liquidity, we expect higher levels of past percentage spreads to impact returns negatively. We also include controls for turnover and lagged volatility to test for any indirect impacts of flu on returns. As expected, the coefficients on order imbalance, OIB, and percentage spread are positive and statistically significant and the coefficient on lagged order imbalance is negative and statistically significant. The impact of turnover and lagged volatility on returns is insignificant except in the specification with headquarters' flu. However, the coefficients on U.S., NY, and headquarters' flu remain significant and similar in magnitude as that estimated without these additional controls. Thus, while contemporaneous OIB and percentage spread are closely related to returns, there appears to be additional information in flu incidence which affects returns.
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Overall these findings confirm that variation in flu incidence has an economically significant impact on the U.S. equity market. We find that a higher incidence of flu is associated with decreases in trading activity, realized volatility, and returns and increases in bid-ask spreads. The increase in bid-ask spreads appears to be driven indirectly from the effects of flu on turnover and volatility.
III.C. Seasonal Affective Disorder
Table VII considers regressions similar to those reported by Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi (2003, 2007) and DeGennaro, Kamstra, and Kramer (2006) with the impact of SAD onset, the U.S. flu variable, and cloud-cover controls on returns, and percentage spread. 11 Since the 10 In unreported regressions, we fit regressions with order imbalance as the dependent variable on flu activity. The results match closely to the results for returns. That is, we find a more negative order imbalance with greater flu incidence, and this result is strongest at the national level and robust to additional controls. 11 Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi (2003, 2007) measure the influence of SAD on returns; DeGennaro, Kamstra, and
Kramer (2006) measure the effects of SAD on NASDAQ inside spreads.
weekly SAD onset variable does not vary by year, we drop our weekly dummies as they would otherwise be collinear with SAD onset. However, interpreting the causation and significance of coefficients on flu becomes more difficult as flu incidence may be correlated with other seasonal effects. To compensate somewhat, we decompose our flu variable into weekly expected and unexpected flu in some of the regressions.
Column (1) of Table VII Column (2) of Table VII reports the impact of SAD on returns. Consistent with the findings of Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi, the coefficient on SAD onset is negative and statistically significant. Column (3) adds total U.S. flu as an independent variable; Column (4) decomposes U.S. flu into expected and unexpected flu incidence. After controlling for SAD and without weekly dummies, the impact of total U.S. flu on returns is positive and statistically significant.
However, decomposition of the flu variable, in Column (4), indicates the impact is driven by expected flu; the impact of expected flu is positive and significant and the impact of unexpected flu is negative and insignificant. Thus, the anomalous results on flu in these return regressions are due to a lack of more comprehensive controls for seasonal variation in returns.
III.D. Robustness Checks
We perform a number of robustness checks. First, we repeat all our regressions using firm-level fixed effects. In all cases, the magnitudes and significance levels on our primary coefficients of interest remain effectively unaltered by using fixed effects regressions.
Second, we also analyze firm-by-firm impacts of the flu on our various measures. For this test, we restrict our sample to firms that have more than 104 weekly observations over the 468 weeks in our sample and at least 26 weeks in the first and last year the firms arise in the sample. We calculate the mean, median, number positive, number negative, and percent positive for each estimated by-firm coefficient on flu. We also calculate the probability of finding the percent positive assuming the null hypothesis that the distribution is a binomial variable with equal likelihood of being positive or negative, i.e., p = 0.5. The percent positive and p-values are consistent with our other results for all the variables we test; that is, the coefficients we find are significant hold for a significant proportion of the individual firms. These results are also robust to testing the firm-by-firm coefficients in a subset of the test sample where the coefficient on flu is significant at or below the 10% level.
Third, to rule out the notion that our results are driven by January and year-end calendar effects, we remove all observations in our disaggregated sample that are in the first and fiftysecond week. Our primary results remain and in a few cases become stronger. For example, in the return regressions, the coefficient on the U.S. flu effect more than doubles.
IV. Pandemics and the U.S. Stock Market
We briefly compare our results with the outcomes of the two major 20 th century pandemics, the 1918-1920 and 1957-1958 outbreaks. These calculations require numerous naive assumptions, such as a linear impact of our flu measures on stock returns, stability in how the flu 18 impacts the stock market, and so on. However, we provide them because they may roughly illustrate the magnitudes involved.
While detailed data on the U.S. markets is not available from either of the prior 20 th century pandemics, we can examine return behavior around those time periods and see whether it is roughly consistent with our estimates from seasonal flu variation. We therefore compare several months after the onset of the flu in each of the prior pandemics with stock returns over that time period. We use the historical NYSE stock return data from Schwert (1990) . On average, approximately 36,000 people died annually in the U.S. from flu or flurelated complications in the 1990's (see Thompson et al. 2003) . 13 Normalizing the fatality rates from the flu by the populations in the U.S. for 1918, 1957, and 1995 (103, 172, and 267 , as each one standard deviation increase in the U.S. flu variable corresponds to a 0.037% decrease in weekly returns) over the duration of the illness using our estimate with weekly dummies and national flu incidence shown in Table VI . A pandemic as severe as the 1918-1920 outbreak would be on the order of seven standard deviations away from the mean. This would imply a -0.26% decrease in stock returns per week.
V. Conclusion
The flu can impact financial market activity by incapacitating key individuals, such as traders and market makers, by affecting overall investing behavior, as well as by decreasing expectations about real economic activity. We study the impact of the flu on stock markets by examining weekly NYSE trading data, compiled from high-frequency TAQ data, and weekly CDC flu data. We consider the impact of flu on both an aggregated NYSE index portfolio and on all NYSE stocks. We find that a higher incidence of flu, particularly of flu in the NY area, is 20 associated with a decrease in trading activity as measured by dollar volume, number of trades, and turnover. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in the flu in the NY area implies a decrease in mean trading activity from 2% to 4.6%, depending on the measure of trading activity used.
Greater incidence of flu is also associated with lower volatility, and this finding is consistent with greater absenteeism implying less information production. Bid-ask spreads also widen during high flu incidence weeks; however, this relation is primarily driven by changes in volume and volatility. Lastly, returns decline with greater flu activity, and this may reflect both the pricing of liquidity and decreased expectations about real economic activity. While the volume and volatility effects are more closely tied to NY area flu incidence, the effects of flu on bid-ask spreads and returns are more strongly associated with the incidence of flu nationally.
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